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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he School District was well aware of Mr. Doe’s history. Indeed, Mr. Doe’s mother had specifically cautioned the teachers and
the principal of the need to keep a watchful eye on him. . . . Sometime in November, Mr. Doe took Ms. Jones to a secluded area and
sexually assaulted her. Ms. Jones, who was menstruating at the
time, bled and vomited during the course of the assault and battery. Upon discovering Mr. Doe and Ms. Jones, a janitor told them
to clean up the mess, returned them to class, and advised the
teachers where he had found them. . . . [T]he teachers had tied
other clothing around her waist to hide it, but [her mother] was
never . . . informed of any of the circumstances leading to the soiling of Ms. Jones’ clothing. . . . The teachers told Ms. Jones not to
tell her mother about the incident and encouraged her to forget it

* Gigi Rollini will graduate in May 2003 with a J.D. from the Florida State University College of Law and an M.P.A. from the FSU Askew School of Public Administration &
Policy. She is the Senior Articles Editor of the Florida State University Law Review, a past
president of the Florida State University Women’s Law Symposium, and a judicial clerk for
Florida’s First District Court of Appeal. Sincere thanks to Professor Steven Gey, for his
guidance in making sense of it all; to my husband, Stephen Thomas, for his encouragement
to put it into words; and to the Law Review staff, particularly Román Ortega-Cowan, Matthew Mears, Chasity O’Steen, Heather Lammers, Courtney Brogan, and Janna Nugent, for
their indispensable assistance and awesome dedication to this Law Review. The views and
opinions expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to any entity with which the author is affiliated.
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had happened at all. . . . Because of these incidents and because
she had begun to engage in self-destructive and suicidal behavior,
Ms. Jones left school and entered a psychiatric hospital. . . . Following her release from the hospital, Ms. Jones attempted to return to school . . . but stayed for only one day because she was once
again battered by Mr. Doe and ridiculed by other students for Mr.
Doe’s earlier sexual attacks on her.1

Following the 1999 United States Supreme Court decision in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,2 Verna Williams, lead
counsel for the plaintiff, wrote that Davis “is a wake-up call to the
nation’s educational institutions—elementary, secondary, and postsecondary alike—to make sure that they take seriously complaints
about a student’s sexual harassment by a peer.”3 Ms. Williams succeeded in convincing the Court that educational institutions should
be required to pay damages under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 “if they turn their backs when students harass one another sexually.”4 While students were previously granted the right to
seek damages against educational institutions if sexually harassed
by a teacher,5 Davis was the first case in which the Court extended
this right under Title IX to students sexually harassed by their fellow
classmates.6
Like Ms. Williams, many women’s rights advocates declared a victory for young women as Davis appeared to finally acknowledge that
students in federally funded educational institutions deserve protection and relief from sexual harassment.7 This victory seemed much
needed, particularly after the American Association of University
Women announced in 1993 that eighty-five percent of all female students experienced some form of sexual harassment, with sixty-five
percent being harassed in the classroom, and seventy-three percent
being harassed in their school hallways.8 The Davis decision appeared to give federally funded educational institutions the motiva-

1. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1999). Murrell is one
of two successful Title IX peer sexual harassment claims to date and demonstrates the
level of severity the harassment must reach to be considered actionable sex discrimination
under Title IX.
2. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
3. Verna Williams, A New Harassment Ruling: Implications for Colleges, 45 CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. 41, A56 (1999).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
6. 526 U.S. at 643.
7. EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES: A WOMAN’S LAW CTR., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
SCHOOLS, available at www.equalrights.org/sexhar/school/sh-scho.htm [hereinafter ERA]
(last viewed Aug. 24, 2002) (on file with author).
8. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1993) [hereinafter AAUW].
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tion needed to adopt effective policies to protect students from the potentially debilitating effects of sexual harassment.9
However, the majority opinion in Davis, written by Justice
O’Connor, sets forth a standard under which students have had difficulty winning their Title IX peer sexual harassment claims.10 While
reiterating the Court’s rejection of the use of agency principles,11 Justice O’Connor concluded that federally funded educational institutions must have actual notice of, and act deliberately indifferent to,
sexual harassment “that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”12 O’Connor
stated that the notice requirement “cabins the range of misconduct
that the statute proscribes”13 and that all of the required factors under this new standard “combine to limit a recipient’s damages liability to circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.”14 While the symbolic significance of granting students the ability to be awarded monetary damages for being subjected to sexual harassment is great, the practical reality is that the
federal circuit courts have been careful to construe O’Connor’s standard narrowly, thus dismissing many students’ Title IX claims even
though they have been subjected to what should amount to actionable sexual harassment. Distillations of the Davis standard vary
from circuit to circuit, and questions remain unanswered as to the
level of control required, the form of actual notice needed to trigger
deliberate indifference, and the extremity of post-notice harassment
needed to show that an educational institution has been deliberately
indifferent.
In this Comment, I consider how the federal circuit courts have
reacted to the Davis decision and discuss whether the lower courts
have consistently applied and interpreted the Davis standard. Specifically, I discuss in Part II the evolution leading to the Davis decision through which a cause of action has been recognized under Title
IX for peer sexual harassment. In Part III, I discuss the standard
arising from Davis. In Part IV, I provide a comparative analysis of
the federal circuit court decisions applying the Davis standard. In
Part V, I conclude by discussing several questions Davis left unre-

9.
10.
11.
(1998).
12.
13.
14.

526 U.S. 629 (1999).
Id. at 650.
Id. at 642; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 645.
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solved that have led to the federal circuit courts’ conservatively construing O’Connor’s Davis standard.
II. RECOGNIZING A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX15 FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS IN FEDERALLY FUNDED EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
A. Legislative Intent of Title IX
Legal questions regarding the applicability of Title VII to protect
students in federally funded educational institutions from discrimination were mooted when Congress passed Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX).16 Congress crafted Title IX broadly
with the intention of reaching all forms of sexual discrimination
within the control of a school, as it states, “No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”17 Senator Birch Bayh, the congressional sponsor of the
amendment, “recognized that discrimination can result from a
school’s attitude, as well as its actions, toward women”18 and stated
that “one of the great failings of the American educational system is
the continuation of corrosive and unjustified discrimination against
women.”19
Title IX forms the basis for student complaints of sexual harassment by a member of his or her educational community.20 The Office
for Civil Rights (OCR), which provides support to the United States
Department of Education, is responsible for enforcing Title IX and
other federal statutes that prohibit discrimination in education programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance.21 The
OCR offers guidelines entitled, “Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third
Parties”22 and maintains the belief that “[w]hen a school makes it
clear that sexual harassment will not be tolerated, trains its staff,

15. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 1681(a).
18. Daniel G. McBride, Guidance for Student Peer Sexual Harassment? Not!, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 523, 535 (1998).
19. 118 CONG. REC. 5,803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
20. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs.,
503 U.S. 60 (1992).
21. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg.
12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997).
22. Id.
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and appropriately responds when harassment occurs, students will
see the school as a safe place where everyone can learn.”23
However, in one Title IX lawsuit, the Court applied a narrow
reading of Title IX’s enforcement ability.24 The Court found that the
only enforcement mechanism for Title IX was the termination of federal money to the discriminatory institution.25 Because this enforcement mechanism only reached the specific program or activity receiving funds and not the entire institution, the Court ruled that Title IX
could only apply to specific programs or activities receiving federal
funds.26 To clarify the purpose of Title IX after this “unacceptable decision,”27 Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 “to
restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation and broad, institution-wide application” of certain civil
rights laws, including Title IX.28
B. Progression of Case History Leading to Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education
Although the language of Title IX does not expressly provide a
private cause of action for student victims of sexual harassment, in
Cannon v. University of Chicago the Court found that Title IX was
sufficiently broad in nature to include an implied private right of action for victims.29 Subsequently, the Court held in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools that private plaintiffs could receive monetary damages for sexual harassment under Title IX.30 The Franklin
Court extended the theories of the traditional line of Title VII sexual
harassment cases31 to faculty-on-student harassment, reiterating
that sexual harassment is sex discrimination; “when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex,
that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.”32 The Franklin
Court ruled that the sexual harassment of a student by a teacher (or
other agent of the school) is considered quid pro quo sexual harassment, a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title IX.33 But as
recently as 1998, the United States Supreme Court “clarified” the
23. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, available at
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/ocrshpam.html (last modified Mar. 21, 2002).
24. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992) (explaining Congress’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove).
28. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687-88
(1994)).
29. 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
30. 503 U.S. at 76.
31. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S 57 (1986).
32. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S at 64).
33. Id.
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standard for holding schools liable for damages under Title IX for
sexual harassment of a student by a teacher in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District.34 The Court held that schools are liable
for damages when a school official with authority to take corrective
action actually knew about the sexual harassment and acted with deliberate indifference.35
Peer sexual harassment is the most common form of sexual harassment in schools, with over eighty percent of students who are
sexually harassed reporting that a peer had sexually harassed
them.36 The number of allegations of peer sexual harassment has
steadily increased throughout the last decade.37 However, determining liability for student-on-student sexual harassment has been a
comparatively arduous journey as determining standards of liability
for workplace sexual harassment. Before Davis, numerous conflicting
lower court decisions made the discussion of school liability for peer
sexual harassment ripe for United States Supreme Court review.
Such conflicts primarily stemmed from defining the appropriate
standards for notice, authority, and responsibility.38
As early as 1993, the Ninth Circuit heard the first case of studenton-student sexual harassment in Doe v. Petaluma.39 Jane Doe, a
middle-school student in Petaluma, was subjected to sexually harassing remarks and behavior for many months by her peers.40 Doe reported the harassment to school officials, who promised to end the
harassment but failed to do so.41 Nor did any school officials inform
Doe or her parents of her rights under Title IX.42 In 1995, the Doe
court theorized that Title VII principles might be applied in determining if a school had notice of peer harassment and failed to take
appropriate corrective action.43
However, cases that followed would further confound, rather than
clarify, liability standards for schools faced with student-on-student
sexual harassment claims. In Burrow v. Postville Community School
District, one federal district court determined that a student may
bring a Title IX cause of action against a school for its knowing failure to take appropriate remedial action in response to the hostile environment created by students at the school.44 In the same year, the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

524 U.S. 274 (1998).
Id. at 292-93.
AAUW, supra note 8.
ERA, supra note 7.
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1449.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1452.
929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
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Fifth Circuit ruled in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District
that a school district should not be held liable for peer sexual harassment under Title IX unless the funding recipient directly committed the sexual harassment or the school district treated the sexual
harassment of one gender more seriously than the sexual harassment of the other.45 The Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss
Davis’s claim on the ground that Title IX provides no private cause of
action for peer sexual harassment.46 This disagreement over the nature of school liability under Title IX gave the United States Supreme Court an opportunity to break the stalemate.
III. THE DAVIS DECISION
The United States Supreme Court chose to address the issue of
peer sexual harassment in the case of Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education.47 As set forth in the complaint, a classmate of fifthgrader LaShonda Davis had subjected her to fondling, offensive
comments, and abusive actions over a five-month period.48 During
that time, LaShonda’s mother pleaded for help from school officials,
but no meaningful action followed.49 One teacher allegedly refused,
for more than three months, to allow LaShonda to change her assigned seat away from her tormentor.50 The school lacked a sexual
harassment policy and procedure that could have helped LaShonda
find a way to remedy the sexual harassment.51 Eventually,
LaShonda’s mother filed a criminal complaint against the harasser
and filed suit against the school district.52 The harasser pleaded
guilty to the criminal charge and finally, the harassment ceased.53
In its Davis ruling, the Court followed the progression of most
lower courts and decided against the view of the Fifth Circuit. The
Court found that just as Title VII is violated if a sexually hostile
working environment is created by co-workers and tolerated by the
employer, Title IX is violated if a fellow student creates a sexually
hostile educational environment and the supervising authorities
knowingly fail to act to eliminate the harassment.54
45. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
46. 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’d and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
47. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
48. Id. at 633 (in reviewing the legal sufficiency of the cause of action, the Court “‘assume[d] the truth of the material facts as set forth in the complaint’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6)).
49. Id. at 633-34.
50. Id. at 635.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 647.
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The Davis ruling did not surprise the OCR. When the OCR issued
its guidelines on the sexual harassment of students in March of 1997,
it suggested that peer sexual harassment should be actionable under
Title IX.55 The OCR criticized the Fifth Circuit as the odd-man-out in
its deviation from other federal courts on the subject of school liability for student-on-student sexual harassment.56 The Fifth Circuit determined in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District that a
school district is not liable under Title IX for peer harassment unless
the school district itself directly discriminates based on sex by responding differently to similar claims of sexual harassment by girls
versus boys.57 The OCR and, ultimately, the United States Supreme
Court believed that this decision was a misapplication of Title IX, as
the OCR explained:
Title IX does not make a school responsible for the actions of the
harassing student, but rather for its own discrimination in failing
to take immediate and appropriate steps to remedy the hostile environment once a school official knows about it. If a student is
sexually harassed by a fellow student, and a school official knows
about it, but does not stop it, the school is permitting an atmosphere of sexual discrimination to permeate the educational program. The school is liable for its own action, or lack of action, in
response to this discrimination. Notably, Title VII cases that hold
that employers are responsible for remedying hostile environment
harassment of one worker by a co-worker apply this same standard.58

In Davis, the United States Supreme Court did not, however, ignore the potential for the courts to be flooded with peer sexual harassment cases.59 The growing body of research at that time showed
that student-on-student sexual harassment was rampant in educational institutional settings, particularly in America’s colleges and
universities.60 The Court thus narrowed the circumstances in which
schools can be held liable and what actions constitute sex discrimination under Title IX. Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority,
stated:
[F]unding recipients are properly held liable in damages only
where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of
55. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg.
12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997).
56. Id.
57. 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996).
58. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,048
(Mar. 13, 1997).
59. 526 U.S. at 648.
60. Id.
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which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims
of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by
the school.61

While Justice O’Connor narrowed the circumstances in which harassment may be actionable, it is clear that this ruling applies to all
levels of education, including institutions of higher learning:
“[R]ecipients of federal funding may be liable for ‘subject[ing]’ their
students to discrimination where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and
the harasser is under the school’s disciplinary authority.”62
Thus, women’s advocacy organizations had their victory: a recognized right under Title IX for student victims of peer sexual harassment to sue schools and districts that fail to respond to sex discrimination occurring under their noses.63 However, a carefully crafted
standard was carved into the woodwork of Davis that so narrows the
range of actionable conduct that only some victims are able to realize
fully their after-the-fact right to be free from sexual harassment. The
Davis holding can hardly be said to be a victory for student victims of
sexual harassment, when the only victims who succeed under Davis
are students utterly debilitated by the harassment. Davis does not
equal the right to be free from sexual harassment, nor is Davis an effective tool to motivate educational institutions to participate in the
effort to eliminate sexual harassment in our schools. Rather, Davis
has been the glue that has held the educational status quo of general
indifference in place.
A. The Actionable Right
The language of Title IX is short and sweet: “No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”64 Congress included an enforcement provision that empowered federal programs offering financial assistance to use “any . .
. means authorized by law” to fulfill the congressional intent of Title
IX.65
While the Court could have concluded that Title IX only bestows a
federal right to terminate funds to a funding recipient in response to
a violation of Title IX, the Court has interpreted the “any means”
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 650.
Id. at 646-47.
ERA, supra note 7.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
Id. § 1682.
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provision as allowing the termination of funding as just one possible
option. The Court has not, however, chosen to limit the federal government’s power to enforce Title IX solely through the termination of
funding.66 The Court justified its broader interpretation of Title IX by
comparing the language in Title IX to the similar language in Title
VI.67 Because the Court had already recognized an implied right of
action in Title VI prior to congressional adoption of Title IX, it was
appropriate to determine that Congress intended the similar language in Title IX to bestow the same private cause of action.68 Thus,
Franklin’s previous approval of the availability of monetary damages
from such an action logically followed.69
However, this right of a private cause of action is limited by the
power under which Congress passed Title IX.70 The Court has treated
Title IX as legislation passed under Congress’s Spending Clause authority.71 While typically Congress cannot abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Spending Clause,72 the United
States Supreme Court has categorized Title IX funds as gifts to the
States,73 through which States agree to waive their immunity from
suit in exchange for the gifted funds.74
However, the United States Supreme Court clarified that the
“mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court.”75 Rather, Congress must manifest “a
clear intent to condition participation” in the federal funding “on a
State’s consent to waive its constitutional immunity.”76 Thus, to sue
under Spending Clause provisions, funding recipients must have adequate notice that they could be liable for particular conduct. This
contractual arrangement allows Congress to encourage certain behavior in exchange for federal funds, but requires Congress to “speak
[in] a clear voice” to ensure an equal understanding of the terms of
the agreement.77
66. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
67. Id. at 694-96; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994) (stating within Title VI: “No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
68. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-96.
69. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
70. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1999).
71. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 for origin of Congress’s Spending Power,
which provides in part: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . to . . .
provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States.”
72. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
73. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 686-87 (1999).
74. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981).
75. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985).
76. Id.
77. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17.
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While the Monroe County Board of Education argued in Davis
that school districts could not have anticipated liability stemming
from student-on-student sexual harassment, the Court relied on its
previous holdings in Gebser and Franklin to suggest that Title IX
peer sexual harassment claims only seek to hold the school district
liable for its own acts of subjecting students to sexual harassment in
its educational programs.78 Thus, the person committing the acts of
sexual harassment becomes less relevant (although not entirely irrelevant), while the reaction the school has to the student’s complaint of sexual harassment becomes key.79
B. The Davis Standard: A Heightened Standard for Student Victims
1. Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive
The issue in Davis was not whether sexual harassment is sex discrimination.80 Nor should the question have been what type of conduct constitutes sexual harassment.81 Rather, the issue in Davis was
whether a recipient of federal funding for an educational program or
activity may be held liable for damages under Title IX for sex discrimination in the form of student-on-student sexual harassment.82
The answer to this question was a no-brainer based on the Court’s
previous line of Title IX decisions.83
O’Connor reaffirmed in Davis that the Court had “previously determined that ‘sexual harassment’ is ‘discrimination’ in the school
context under Title IX” when a school acts with deliberate indifference to complaints of sexual harassment.84 The Court easily could
have determined that the same actions sufficient to raise a hostile
environment claim under Title VII, including demands for sexual favors, sexual advances, fondling, indecent exposure, and sexual assault,85 are equally sufficient to raise a hostile environment claim
under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment when these
78. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999).
79. Id.
80. The U.S. Supreme Court established that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
81. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (providing examples of sexual
harassment that may constitute sex discrimination under Title VII).
82. 526 U.S. at 643.
83. Or at least Justice O’Connor’s opinion suggests the answer was easy. See Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (rejecting agency principles, but defining standard for school reaction using the deliberate indifference standard to determine
whether the school subjected the student to sexual harassment after receiving notice of
teacher-student harassment); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76
(1992) (same). Of course, if Title IX serves to protect students from sex discrimination, it
would be absurd to bar some people in the school community from engaging in such discriminatory conduct but not others.
84. 526 U.S. at 650.
85. See generally Vinson, 477 U.S. 57.
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acts are ignored by a school that has the authority and control to correct them.
Yet, in Davis, Justice O’Connor used the Spending Clause’s adequate notice requirement to define “discrimination” in a new light.
While admitting that the Court had “elsewhere concluded that sexual
harassment is a form of discrimination for Title IX purposes and that
Title IX proscribes harassment with sufficient clarity to satisfy
Pennhurst’s notice requirement and serve as a basis for a damages
action,”86 O’Connor went on to conclude that Title IX’s other provisions “help give content to the term ‘discrimination’ in this context.”87
At that point, she started down the path of categorizing a special
brand of sexual harassment specifically for students in the context of
a Title IX action.
Justice O’Connor explained that “[s]tudents are not only protected
from discrimination, but also specifically shielded from being ‘excluded from participation in’ or ‘denied the benefits of’ any ‘education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.’”88 Her
summary of Title IX suggests that it not only serves to protect students generally from sexual harassment as we have come to define it
in the massive catalogs of sexual harassment cases, but also to protect students from discriminatory conduct that would exclude or obstruct their access to the same educational opportunities and benefits
that all students are free to enjoy.89 This was likely the intent of
Congress in passing Title IX.90
However, O’Connor skipped over her own “not only” language to
combine the two standards into one: Title IX only protects sex discrimination that serves to bar access to educational programs and activities. This simplification of standards ignores the portion of Title
IX’s language that grants students the right to be free from exclusion
from an educational program on the basis of sex or be subjected to
discrimination under an educational program on the basis of sex.91
Justice O’Connor stated, “[t]he statute makes clear that, whatever
else it prohibits, students must not be denied access to educational
benefits and opportunities on the basis of gender,”92 but neglected to
return to the question of what else the statute prohibits. The clear
language of the statute, in allowing for several kinds of conduct to be
86. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649-50.
87. Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
88. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994)).
89. Id.
90. As Senator Bayh, the sponsor of the amendment that created Title IX, stated:
“[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which . . . is needed if we are to provide
women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers.”
118 CONG. REC. 5803, 5806-07 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
92. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (emphasis added).
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violative of Title IX, demonstrates Congress’s intention for Title IX to
eliminate sexual harassment, not just sexual harassment that
reaches such a severe level that it debilitates a student to the point of
emotionally or physically barring access to his or her education.
Thus, based on this extremely narrow reading of Title IX’s prohibited conduct, the Court felt the need to be “constrained to conclude
that student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can
likewise rise to the level of discrimination actionable under the statute.”93 It is only when the sexual harassment is sufficiently severe
that it can be said to bar access to educational opportunities and activities that the school must become involved to correct the acts. The
reasoning is that Title IX only prohibits the school from denying educational opportunities, programs, and activities based on sex or gender. Thus, if the sexual harassment does not reach this level, it is not
within the realm of Title IX protection.94
By placing the standard for the sexual harassment level of severity so high, it effectively destroys Title IX’s ability to achieve Congress’s goal, while simultaneously redefining what types of sexual
harassment constitute sex discrimination for a certain subclass of
victims. The students that Title IX is intended to protect often have
few options for mobility, virtually no authority to correct disruptive
behavior on their own, and are required to attend an interactive educational institution where they must face their harassers on a daily
basis. However, Justice O’Connor in Davis stated that although “recipients may be liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts
of peer sexual harassment . . . the dissent erroneously imagines that
victims of peer harassment now have a Title IX right to make particular remedial demands (contemplating that victim could demand
new desk assignment).”95
In the United States Supreme Court decision in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.,96 the Court recognized the importance of defining the
level of sexual harassment required before a victim could sue for relief. The Court developed the “reasonable woman” standard to determine what conduct can be actionable as “abusive work environment” harassment.97 The Court held that even where it does not “‘seriously affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being’ or ‘lead the
[employee] to suffe[r] injury,’”98 conduct could be considered actionable sexual harassment. This statement recognized that sexual har-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 648 (citation omitted).
510 U.S. 17, 20-23 (1993).
Id. at 20.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).

1000

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:987

assment is unlawful under Title VII, even without evidence that the
harassment damaged the victim’s well-being.
Harris involved an employee who left her employer after months
of enduring crude remarks and propositions from the firm’s president.99 The employer attempted to argue that because Harris had no
physical injury, nor any evidence of psychological damage, the conduct was not severe and pervasive enough to affect her working conditions. The Court found that the behavior the plaintiff endured
would reasonably be harmful to women, whereas it probably would
have been merely offensive to men and not so severe that it would affect work performance.100
In Harris, the Court attempted to find a compromise between
making any conduct that is merely offensive actionable and requiring
the conduct to cause a “tangible psychological injury.”101 The Court
found that Title VII protects an employee from having to “endure
sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously
affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation.”102
Thus, the Court began to develop what later would be dubbed the
“reasonable woman” standard, which allowed the Court to look at
whether sexual conduct in the workplace reasonably could affect a
woman being subjected to that type of sexual conduct. This standard
did not rely on tangible injury but rather considered whether the
conduct was the type that could reasonably lead a woman to suffer
tangible injury.103
In Harris, the Court recognized the congressional purpose of Title
VII was to protect employees from discrimination. However, in Davis,
the Court forgot this important goal.104 Rather, we see schoolgirls
having mental breakdowns from enduring daily threats, physical

99. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 21.
102. Id.
103. This standard later became referred to as the “reasonable person” standard, but
still considers whether the conduct is the type that could lead to tangible injury for a person similarly situated to the plaintiff.
104. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999) (“The dissent fails
to appreciate these very real limitations on a funding recipient’s liability under Title IX . . .
we [do not] contemplate, much less hold, that a mere ‘decline in grades is enough to survive’ a motion to dismiss.”) (quoting id. at 677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); see Gabrielle M.
v. Park Forest-Chic. Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 828-29 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J., concurring) (noting that like in the employment context, where the Supreme Court
has “firmly rejected any requirement that the victim of harassment suffer the equivalent of
a nervous breakdown before she can recover under a hostile environment theory . . . a hostile environment should be actionable before it results in consequences so dramatic as hospitalization or leaving school.”).
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withdraw from school, and escalating suicidal tendencies.105 This can
hardly be the optimal goal Title IX was created to achieve.106
2. Deliberate Indifference to Actual Notice
Because the Davis Court rejected the use of agency principles to
support a claim of sex discrimination for peer sexual harassment under Title IX,107 the school cannot be held liable for the independent
acts of third parties who are not in authoritative positions capable of
effectuating change.108 Rather, as Gebser established, an educational
institution violates Title IX and can be liable for damages where it is
“deliberately indifferent” to known acts of harassment.109
This Davis standard was borrowed directly from Gebser, where
the Court previously determined that a student could sue under Title
IX for a school’s deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment
by a teacher. While the Monroe County Board of Education tried to
argue in Davis that liability for sexual harassment by students
rather than teachers was beyond the scope of Title IX, the Court reiterated its rejection of agency principles in Title IX liability.110 The
Davis Court answered “whether the misconduct identified in Gebser—deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment—amounts
to an intentional violation of Title IX, capable of supporting a private
damages action, when the harasser is a student rather than a
teacher. We conclude . . . it does.”111
The Court explained, as had the OCR previously, that the liability
stems not from the fact that the sexual harassment occurred, but
rather begins when the educational institution knows that the harassment is occurring and fails to respond.112 Thus, the response of the
educational institution in the face of known sexual misconduct
105. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253
(6th Cir. 2000); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999).
106. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (Congress enacted Title IX
with two principal objectives in mind: “[T]o avoid the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices” and “to provide individual citizens effective protection against
those practices.”).
107. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643 (“As an initial matter, in Gebser, we expressly rejected
the use of agency principles in the Title IX context, noting the textual difference between
Title IX and Title VII . . . (invoking agency principles on ground that definition of ‘employer’ in Title VII includes agents of employer).”) (citations omitted).
108. See id. at 644 (“A recipient cannot be directly liable . . . where it lacks the authority to take remedial action.”).
109. Id. at 643.
110. Id. at 640-42.
111. Id. at 643.
112. Id. at 644-45 (stating that “[i]f a funding recipient does not engage in harassment
directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference ‘subject[s]’ its
students to harassment. That is, the deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, ‘cause
[students] to undergo’ harassment or ‘make them liable or vulnerable’ to it.”) (quoting
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1415 (1966)).
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within the control and boundaries of the school is key in determining
whether the school caused the student to be “subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”113
For the Court to reach a determination of whether an educational
institution acted with deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must establish that actual notice was given to the educational institution. However, unlike in Title VII sexual harassment cases, the Davis Court
did not require that the school have a formal school policy describing
the method of giving actual notice (to put potential victims on notice
of their rights and obligations) or describe the form of notice required. The only standard given in Davis was that “[d]eliberate indifference makes sense as a theory of direct liability under Title IX only
where the funding recipient has some control over the alleged harassment. A recipient cannot be directly liable for its indifference
where it lacks the authority to take remedial action.”114 Naturally,
the federal circuit courts have used different methods to determine
what this actual notice requirement means.115
In Davis, LaShonda Davis, the student victim, made repeated reports to her classroom teacher and her mother. Upon inquiry, the
teacher told the mother that the school principal had been informed
of the incidents.116 No disciplinary action was taken subsequent to
these reports. Following the reports, the sexual harassment continued.117 LaShonda reported these incidents to her physical education
teacher. One week later, another sexually harassing incident occurred under the supervision of another teacher. LaShonda reported
it to the supervising teacher and her mother again followed up.
Eventually, with no action even attempted by the school to curb the
behavior toward LaShonda, the primary harasser was charged with
and pleaded guilty to sexual battery. In the end, LaShonda was subjected to five months of harassment without so much as a seat
change made to move her away from her harasser.118 Finally, the
harassment ceased, but only after LaShonda’s previously high grades
had dropped and she had written a suicide note.119

113. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
114. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644.
115. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
116. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-34. The incidents at this point included peers attempting to
touch LaShonda’s breasts and genital area and vulgar statements such as “I want to get in
bed with you” and “I want to feel your boobs.” Id.
117. Id. Following the first set of reports, the sexual harassment included a student
placing a doorstop in his pants followed by sexually suggestive mannerisms during physical education class. Id.
118. Id. at 635.
119. Id. at 634.
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Because there were so many attempts made by both the student
and the mother, the Davis Court had no difficulty determining
whether there had been actual notice. Additionally, because the complaints continued over five months with the harassment ceasing only
when the criminal justice system stepped in, it was clear that the
school had not responded to the complaints in an effective manner.
Nor did the school provide training on how to handle student complaints of sexual harassment, have a policy for students and parents
to follow if they needed to report sexual harassment, or have any
personnel designated to handle sexual harassment complaints.120
However, whether actual notice had been given becomes more difficult to determine in cases where parents fail to become involved,
teachers fail to pass the reports on to authoritative personnel who
have the power to make corrections, or fewer reports of harassment
are made.
Once a plaintiff overcomes the hurdle of actual notice, the Davis
Court established that the school must act with “deliberate indifference” to that complaint for Title IX liability to attach. However, the
phrase is amorphous. While on one hand it suggests a school must be
responsive in the face of a sexual harassment complaint, the Court
took a step back, explaining that “courts should refrain from secondguessing the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.”121
Rather, courts should declare a school deliberately indifferent “only
where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack thereof is
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”122 This is
not a reasonableness standard or a simple negligence standard. As
Justice O’Connor explains, this standard does not actually require
the school to “remedy” peer harassment, just to act in a manner not
clearly unreasonable as a matter of law.123
This student standard is so high that Justice O’Connor expressed
doubt regarding whether LaShonda Davis would be able to show on
remand that the school’s response to her five months of complaints
was “clearly unreasonable.”124 O’Connor suggested that Davis may be
able to show that because the school failed to respond in any way
during those five months that the school acted “clearly unreasonably.” However, this twinge of doubt laid the foundation for the nearly
impossible standard under which students could effectuate the broad
and noble goals of Title IX.
120. Id. at 635.
121. Id. at 648.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 648-49.
124. Id. at 649 (stating that “it remains to be seen whether petitioner can show that
the Board’s response to reports of G.F.’s misconduct was clearly unreasonable in light of
the known circumstances”).
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS:
DISPARITY AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Since the Davis ruling in 1999, the federal circuit courts have reviewed numerous peer sexual harassment cases. While not exactly
the flood of litigation of which the dissent in Davis warned, there are
enough cases to determine that the federal circuit courts of appeal
are not entirely comfortable with the Davis standard. Although the
federal circuit courts understand the general test set forth in Davis,
they are struggling to define the vague terms within the Davis test.
Accordingly, the courts have narrowly construed the Davis standard,
cognizant of the unanswered questions. This conservativism has resulted in few winning student Title IX claims for either teacherstudent or student-on-student sexual harassment.
The federal circuit courts, while understanding the general Davis
standard, still vary in their presentation of the essential elements of
Davis liability. While some circuits focus primarily on the specifically
enumerated Davis elements—that Title IX liability requires that 1)
the sexual harassment be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school; 2) the funding recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment; and 3)
the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the harassment125—other circuits also include an element that the school district must have the power to exercise substantial control over both
the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.126
However, how the federal circuits have defined each of these elements varies widely, with several circuits commenting on the lack of
guidance in O’Connor’s Davis opinion.127 Consequently, the courts
have been left to search in the pages of the Davis opinion for some
guiding light. What they have been left with is a dissent in Davis
that warns of a barrage of litigation that will drain taxpayer dollars
125. This includes the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. See Vance v. Spencer
County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000); Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20
(1st Cir. 1999); Adusumilli v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., No. 98-3561, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17954
(7th Cir. July 21, 1999); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
126. This includes the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See P.H. v. The Sch. Dist. of Kan.
City, 265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th
Cir. 2000).
127. See, e.g., P.H., 265 F.3d at 662 (“[T]he actual notice standard of Gebser has not yet
been clearly defined.”); Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1252 (Anderson, J., concurring) (“The . . . majority wisely ‘decline[s] . . . to name job titles that would or would not adequately satisfy’
Davis’ requirement that the school have control over the harassing student[,] . . . leaving
liability limited in general terms to cases involving ‘an official decision by the [Title IX] recipient not to remedy the violation.’”) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 642); Wills, 184 F.3d at
31 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (“This is a vexing case for many reasons. The facts are difficult.
The applicable law is complex and evolving . . . with . . . unruly elements . . . .”).
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and a majority opinion that attempts to persuade readers that it is
sufficiently narrow to combat this misconception while still offering
relief to victims.
A. Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive
Understanding that Davis requires sexual harassment to be “so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school,”128 the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have attempted to determine at what threshold sexual harassment becomes actionable sex discrimination under Title IX. While
always a prong that must be satisfied, other circuits stopped short of
this severe and pervasive inquiry upon finding other prongs of the
Davis standard were not met. However, four circuits that have addressed the severe and pervasive prong represent the continuum on
which most peer sexual harassment cases will fall: the Seventh Circuit found the conduct was not severe enough;129 the First Circuit
found that while the one incident of sexual harassment was severe,
without a second incident it could not be considered to pervade the
student’s educational environment to the point of compromising her
educational opportunities;130 and the Sixth and Tenth Circuits found
the conduct to be egregious enough to be considered severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive enough to satisfy the prong.131
The Seventh Circuit in Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology132 defined the severe and pervasive requirement through the use
of scattered narrowing terms and phrases used in the Davis majority
opinion. It stated that actionable conduct must be “severe and repeated . . . and must have a systemic effect.”133 The Seventh Circuit
went on to explain that “[s]ingle incidents of student misconduct are
unlikely to have such an effect . . . [s]ince in each instance the conduct ceased as soon as it occurred, and was not repeated.”134
In Adusumilli, the student-plaintiff filed an action under Title IX
for being subjected to sexual harassment on twelve separate occasions by four professors and six students.135 While some of these incidents were simply described by the court as “ogling” and “unwanted

128. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
129. See Adusumilli, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 17954.
130. See Wills, 184 F.3d 20.
131. See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000);
Murrell, 186 F.3d 1238.
132. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17954, at *4.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *1.
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touching,”136 at least two incidents involved touching her breasts. Because the Seventh Circuit found the student had only reported two of
the twelve incidents, the Court declined to address whether those
unreported incidents were severe. The two incidents that were reported, including the touching of her shoulder by one student and the
touching of her breast by another student, were analyzed under the
Davis severity prong.137
Because the Circuit Court refused to consider all of the incidents
due to failure to give actual notice, the Court concluded that the two
reported incidents were each single occurrences of isolated incidents
that in themselves were not severe and did not permeate the student’s educational experience with sex discrimination.138 Since there
were no future incidents, the effect of the harassment ceased with
the conduct, and there was no action the school needed to take.
Under the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Davis “severe
and pervasive” requirement, after a report of sexual harassment is
made, there must be repeated occurrences of sexual harassment by
the same perpetrator to evidence harassment that is “severe and repeated” enough to cause a “systemic effect” coupled with a school that
did nothing to keep the repeated instances from happening.139 This
view of the severe and pervasive requirement suggests that it measures not whether the harassment in itself is objectively or subjectively severe, but rather, the effect the harassment has on the student after repeated instances.140

136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *4.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit recently went on to add that actionable conduct
must be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it has a ‘concrete, negative effect’ on the victim’s access to education.” Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, Ill.
Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 821-23 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). However, the concurrence takes issue with the majority’s determination that “[a]lthough [Gabrielle M.] was
diagnosed with some psychological problems, the record shows that her grades remained
steady and her absenteeism from school did not increase. Nothing in the record shows that
she was denied any educational opportunities by [the harassing student’s] actions.” Id. at
823. This concurrence explains that this “view of the way in which harassment can interfere with a student’s educational opportunities is too narrow . . . . Certainly at the kindergarten level, where learning social skills is at least as important as academic instruction,
grades do not tell the complete story . . . in Title IX cases we have repeatedly rejected the
notion that a victim’s ability to keep doing her job in the face of harassment will defeat her
contention that the workplace was hostile.” Id. at 828 (Rovner, J., concurring). The concurrence then goes on to suggest that
[i]f anything, courts ought to be more flexible in assessing the harms that a
child experiences as a result of harassment, given that children (especially
young children) are far less able to articulate the fact and extent of their injuries and may manifest an array of different reactions to the harassment . . . .
Neither she nor future victims of school place harassment should be penalized
simply because they seem resilient.
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The First Circuit in Wills v. Brown University defined the Davis
severity requirement as having a lower threshold than that of the
Seventh Circuit.141 The First Circuit attempted to define Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment in light of Title VII’s more developed standard, as the Court stated:
The rubric ‘hostile environment[]’ applies where the acts of sexual
harassment are sufficiently severe to interfere with the workplace
or school opportunities normally available to the worker or student
. . . . Broadly speaking, a hostile environment claim requires the
victim to have been subjected to harassment severe enough to
compromise the victim’s employment or educational opportunities .
. . .142

Thus, the First Circuit defined the severe and pervasive requirement
as simply “compromising” a student’s educational opportunities,
rather than barring or denying educational opportunities. However,
although the First Circuit appeared to present a lower severe and
pervasive standard for Title IX liability than Davis set forth, the student’s claim in Wills did not survive the legal analysis actually applied in her case. 143
Wills sued Brown University after her chemistry teacher inappropriately touched her.144 Wills had approached her teacher after having difficulty with her organic chemistry class.145 While purporting to
pray with her in his office, the teacher pulled Wills into his lap and
fondled her breasts under her shirt.146 Wills immediately met with
the university official responsible for administering complaints of
sexual harassment to report the incident.147 In response to the complaint, Brown University officials placed the teacher on probation
and issued a written reprimand warning against another such incident.148 The university did not inflict harsher punishment because
they believed it to be the teacher’s first incident.149 They were
wrong.150 Not only did the teacher have a string of complaints prior to
Wills’s incident, but he continued similar behavior following the rep-

Id. at 829. In Gabrielle M., the student victim lost her excitement for school, resisted attending, lost her appetite, and began wetting her bed. Id. at 828. The concurrence appropriately points out that “[i]t is easy to imagine how such trauma might have interfered
with her access to educational opportunities.” Id.
141. 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999).
142. Id. at 25-26.
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id. at 23.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 24.
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rimand with no further action taken.151 Only two months later,
Brown University renewed his contract for another year and
awarded him a raise.152
Wills’s Title IX claim was unsuccessful because her claim “was of
a single specific harassment incident that occurred before the reprimand and the later complaints (albeit one that caused continuing
damages).”153 While Wills attempted to show that Brown University
was subjecting her and other students to sex discrimination through
a general indifference to continuing sexual harassment, the First
Circuit held that subsequent reports by other students of similar
harassment by the same teacher were not relevant.154 Rather, “absent a second physical assault by [the teacher] on Wills, or some form
of direct harassment, Wills had no claim for sex discrimination
against Brown occurring after [the first incident].”155
Yet, as the dissent in Wills pointed out, the majority failed to appreciate “[t]he proposition that the presence of a harasser can rise to
the level of hostile environment sex discrimination [which] finds
support in the Title VII context.”156 The dissent encouraged the majority to consider adopting an objective standard of whether a student in the plaintiff’s position “would find [the teacher’s] mere presence at [the school] created a hostile environment.”157
While O’Connor in Davis cautioned against lower courts finding
schools liable for a single instance of even sufficiently severe sexual
harassment, O’Connor limited private damages to situations “having
a systemic effect on educational programs or activities,” not simply
on one individual student.158 As O’Connor states, “[e]ven the dissent
suggests that Title IX liability may arise when a funding recipient
remains indifferent to severe, gender-based mistreatment played out
on a ‘widespread level’ among students.”159 There is room under
Davis for the First Circuit to have determined that Brown’s general
attitude toward student complaints of sexual harassment by a particular teacher was enough to establish a severe permeation of sex
discrimination throughout the program. By defeating an individual
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 26-27.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 33 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (describing the position
taken by the majority of the court).
156. Id. at 38 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (referring to Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 1991), where an employer’s decision to allow one employee who had formerly harassed a female co-worker to transfer back into her office after
a six-month “cooling off period,” created a hostile working environment).
157. Id. (creating a “reasonable female student” standard by harkening to the “reasonable woman standard” used in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
158. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999) (emphasis added).
159. Id.
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student’s claim on the basis that her single instance of individual
sexual harassment was not severe enough to result in a systemic effect on that individual, harassers can harass indefinitely, so long as
they never harass the same student more than once.
The result in Wills is important because it is a Title IX teacherstudent sexual harassment claim that fails.160 Though the First Circuit has yet to decide a Title IX peer sexual harassment case, the result will likely be similarly disheartening without facts as strong as
those found in Davis. This hypothesis finds support in Davis, as
O’Connor explained that:
The fact that it was a teacher who engaged in harassment in
Franklin and Gebser is relevant. The relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to which the
misconduct can be said to breach Title IX’s guarantee of equal access to educational benefits and to have a systemic effect on a program or activity. Peer harassment, in particular, is less likely to
satisfy these requirements than is teacher-student harassment.161

The only federal circuit courts to find peer sexual harassment severe and pervasive enough to satisfy the Davis standard are the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits. Unlike the First and Seventh Circuits,
these courts look to the facts of Davis, rather than the terminology,
to define what conduct can be considered severe and pervasive. In
the cases decided to date, these circuits considered the pattern of behavior, its tangible effects on the student victims, and then compared
them with Davis.
In Vance v. Spencer County Public School District, a student,
Alma McGowen, experienced physical and verbal sexual torment
over the course of several years, including being stabbed in the hand,
being held by several classmates while others tried to rip off her
clothes, and being subjected to continuous verbal sexual comments,
even after a detailed complaint had been filed with the school’s Title
IX coordinator.162 No investigation resulted, and school officials continued to use the same ineffective method of merely discussing the
incidents with the perpetrators.163 Typically, following these discussions, the sexual harassment of Alma by her classmates would escalate.164
In Murrell v. School District No. 1, a developmentally and physically disabled student, Penelope Jones, was allegedly subjected to
sustained sexual harassment, including sexual assault and battery,
160. 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999).
161. 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999).
162. 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000).
163. Id. at 256. The court seems to imply the lack of reaction may have stemmed from
one of the perpetrators being a school board member’s son.
164. Id.
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over the course of one month.165 After being warned by the assaulting
student’s mother of his sexually aggressive tendencies and after
teachers became aware that he was, in fact, engaging in sexually aggressive behavior toward Penelope, the school allowed the harasser
to act as a janitor’s assistant, granting him special access to unsupervised areas of the school.166 It was in this capacity that he took
Penelope to a secluded area and sexually assaulted her.167 Due to the
escalation of the harassment, Penelope became self-destructive and
suicidal and entered a psychiatric hospital.168 Upon her release and
return to school, Penelope was back only one day when she was once
again battered by her former harasser and humiliated by the other
students who knew about the earlier sexual attacks.169
Similar to Davis, Vance and Murrell had a pattern of escalating
sexual behavior committed by the same peers each time that resulted
in a serious tangible physical effect on the student victim. In Davis,
LaShonda’s grades had dropped and she had written a suicide
note.170 In Vance, Alma had to complete her studies at home after being diagnosed with depression.171 In Murrell, Penelope suffered selfdestructive and suicidal tendencies necessitating entering a psychiatric hospital.172
These cases are clearly severe, and neither the Sixth nor Tenth
Circuits had difficulty casting them as such. However, it seems odd
that Title IX would require harassment to reach this level of extremity.173 Not only is the Harris purpose left by the wayside,174 but also
Title IX is likely to have little impact upon schools that think nothing
this extreme could ever happen under their control. If Title IX has
any purpose, it must be to eradicate sex discrimination in federally
funded educational institutions, not merely to compensate student
victims who have been driven over the brink. For this goal to be realized, the severe and pervasive standard must allow student victims
to succeed in court without having to suffer a mental breakdown.
This may be the only way to persuade schools to react after the very
first complaint, before any more damage can be inflicted.
165. 186 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999) (construing the facts as true to review the
lower court’s granting of a motion to dismiss).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1244.
170. 526 U.S. 629, 634 (1999).
171. 231 F.3d 253, 257 (6th Cir. 2000).
172. 186 F.3d at 1244.
173. Id. at 1252 (Anderson, J. concurring) (“The allegations in this case are . . . egregious. . . . Whether less egregious facts will suffice in future cases remains to be seen.”).
174. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (holding that employees should not
be made to endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation).
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B. Actual Notice
Unlike the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, where there was clear and
ample actual notice to high-ranking school authorities, the question
of actual notice to school officials defeated student claims in the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Unlike other circuits, the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits each focused on whether a district exercised substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred as an ancillary prong simultaneously analyzed
with the actual notice requirement. While most circuits have not
formally added this fourth prong to the Davis test, O’Connor did suggest in Davis that “[d]eliberate indifference makes sense as a theory
of direct liability under Title IX only where the funding recipient has
some control over the alleged harassment. A recipient cannot be directly liable for its indifference where it lacks the authority to take
remedial action.”175
The Ninth Circuit, in Reese v. Jefferson School District No. 14J,
determined that the students suing for Title IX sexual harassment
did not give actual notice to school officials who had the power to
remedy the harassment.176 The students, who had already graduated,
sued the school for ongoing harassment during high school by a
group of male peers.177 However, the Ninth Circuit held that although there may have been evidence that a teacher witnessed conduct that may have put the school on notice, this was not sufficient to
establish that actual notice had been given to an official with the
power to correct the harassment.178 Thus, the Ninth Circuit defined
the actual notice requirement narrowly to include direct reporting to
an official with the authority to effectuate change. While other circuits have questioned whether notice to a teacher, who either has
limited control over the immediate conduct or can pass the information on to an official with authority, should satisfy the actual notice
requirement, the Ninth Circuit appears to have determined that actual notice is both a formalistic and substantive standard.
The Eighth Circuit has taken an even more narrow view of the
Davis actual notice requirement. In P.H. v. School District of Kansas
City,179 where a student sued for sex discrimination under Title IX for
a two-year sexual relationship with a teacher, the Eighth Circuit defined actual notice as an actual notice-plus standard: “a school district must have had actual notice of a teacher’s sexual harassment of
a student and the school district must have made an official decision
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

526 U.S. at 644.
208 F.3d 736, 740-41 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 740.
265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001).
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not to remedy the violation in order for liability to attach to the
school district.”180 While P.H. argued that the actual notice standard
had not yet been clearly defined and suggested that teachers could in
some situations have the necessary control to take corrective action,
the Eighth Circuit held that no constructive notice is permissible under Davis; rather, the notice must be actual and to a school official.181
From the current case law guidance, to be successful under a Title
IX peer sexual harassment claim there must be actual notice to an official with the power to address the complaint. However, because
Davis never required schools to maintain sexual harassment policies
and reporting procedures, it is questionable whether students and
parents will understand either their rights or their obligations under
Davis. Additionally, it is questionable whether a student’s individual
complaint to a teacher, the most logical person to whom a student
would report incidents, may establish the actual notice required to
seek damages for continued sexual harassment. Rather, students,
regardless of age, will have to recognize that their complaints must
be made to a high-ranking official of the school. Thus far, this person
has been the school principal in the cases that have been successful.182 The Murrell concurrence criticizes Davis, as it points to Justice
Kennedy’s dissent, which stated: “‘[T]he majority says not one word
about the type of school employee who must know about the harassment before it is actionable.’”183 If the student is more comfortable
discussing such matters with a teacher or guidance counselor and is
told the situation will be corrected, but that complaint never reaches
the principal, it is possible that even if the sexual harassment continues, the school will bear no responsibility for its inaction. This appears to be the standard irrespective of whether the principal has
made any effort to require faculty, when a complaint is brought to
their attention, to instruct students of their rights and responsibilities and encourage the student to report the incident to the principal.
C. Deliberate Indifference
Davis defined deliberate indifference as the equivalent to not acting “clearly unreasonable,”184 a phrase the courts have had to struggle to define. Under the two successful circuit level student peer sexual harassment Title IX claims, the phrase “deliberate indifference”
180. Id. at 661.
181. Id. at 663.
182. See Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (Anderson, J.,
concurring) (“Davis did not answer this question precisely, leaving liability limited in general terms to cases involving ‘an official decision by the [Title IX] recipient not to remedy
the violation.’”) (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999)).
183. Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
184. 526 U.S. at 630.
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was defined as a two-step inquiry into 1) whether a school took any
steps to address the complaint of sexual harassment;185 and if so, 2)
whether the steps taken were not clearly unreasonable steps to address the complaint of sexual harassment.186
However, in at least two losing Title IX student actions, the First
and Sixth circuits only looked to whether the school took any remedial steps, without considering the effectiveness or timing.187 In Wills
v. Brown University,188 because the university took some action after
Wills’s complaint, and because a second incident did not take place,
the First Circuit found that the university did take action when it issued the chemistry teacher a letter of reprimand and instructed him
not to do it again or be fired.189 However, the crux of Wills’s argument
was that the only reason this incident occurred was because the university had failed to respond to previous students’ complaints about
the same teacher. Had the university responded to the sexual harassment at that time, the teacher would not have continued to harass
students.190 Additionally, Wills argued that because other students
were subsequently harassed, she should be permitted to admit evidence that even after her complaint, still the university acted with
deliberate indifference to the continued sexual harassment.191 The
First Circuit, however, held that the incidents following Wills’s complaint were irrelevant as to her claim, and because no second incident occurred to her, the university’s letter of reprimand must have
worked to protect Wills.192
The Sixth Circuit in Soper v. Hoben193 also held for the school district when remedial steps were taken after the rape of a special education student by three of her classmates at school and on the bus.194
The Sixth Circuit in the Soper majority opinion stated that:
[P]laintiffs have failed to present any evidence of deliberate indifference attributable to defendants. Once they did learn of the inci-

185. See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248 (stating that the school “had actual knowledge . . .
from almost the moment it began to occur, and not only refused to remedy the harassment
but actively participated in concealing it”).
186. See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 262 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“Spencer continued to use the same ineffective methods to no acknowledged avail. Although ‘talking to the offenders’ produced no results, Spencer continued to employ this ineffective method. . . . However, the harassing conduct not only continued but also increased
as a result.”).
187. See, e.g., Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999); Soper v. Hoben, 195
F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999).
188. 184 F.3d 20.
189. Id. at 23.
190. Id. at 26.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 26-27.
193. 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999).
194. Id.
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dents, they quickly and effectively corrected the situation. Defendants immediately contacted the proper authorities, investigated
the incidents themselves, installed windows in the doors of the
special education classroom, placed an aide in Harmala’s classroom, and created student counseling sessions concerning how to
function socially with the opposite sex.195

However, as the Soper partial dissent points out, these are admirable
steps for the school to take, but they can be considered immediately
responsive only if the final rape is considered the lone reported incident.196 Prior to the rape, however, there were known incidents reported to teachers: earlier sexual advances on the plaintiff by one of
the boys, and the victim’s mother’s requests for the two students to
never be left alone together unsupervised.197 Although the victim’s
mother was assured care would be taken, “no steps were actually
taken to minimize or stop the harassment. The specific request that
Renee not be alone in the presence of Boy A was ignored. Arguably,
these actions amounted to deliberate indifference to the concerns
about harassment brought to Renee’s teachers by her mother.”198
The two-step process used in Murrell and Vance is superior for defining the Davis deliberate indifference standard. Courts must ask
whether any response was made following the initial complaint of
sexual harassment, and whether that response was effective in deterring continued sexual harassment. Otherwise, useless remedial efforts, or efforts that come too late to protect a student from seriously
debilitating acts of sexual harassment, become a loophole through
which schools may escape Title IX liability.
V. CONCLUSION: LINGERING QUESTIONS AFTER DAVIS
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Davis sets forth a standard
under which students have had difficulty winning their Title IX peer
sexual harassment claims.199 While reiterating the Court’s rejection
of the use of agency principles, O’Connor concluded that for federally
funded educational institutions to be liable for peer sexual harassment, they must have actual notice of, and act deliberately indifferent to, sexual harassment that is so severe, pervasive and objectively
offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.200
O’Connor stated that the notice requirement “cabins the range of

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 855.
Id. at 857 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 848.
Id.
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999).
Id. at 650.

2003]

A HOLLOW VICTORY

1015

misconduct that the statute proscribes”201 and that all of the required
factors under this new standard “combine to limit a recipient’s damages liability to circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the
known harassment occurs.”202
While the symbolic significance of granting students the ability to
be awarded monetary damages for being subjected to sexual harassment is great, the practical reality is that the federal circuit courts
have been careful to construe O’Connor’s standard narrowly, constructing a high hurdle for students to overcome. This has led to the
dismissal of many students’ Title IX claims even though the student
has been subjected to what should amount to actionable sexual harassment.
Distillations of the Davis standard vary from circuit to circuit, and
questions remain unanswered as to the form of the actual notice necessary, to whom the notice must be given, and the level of control required by the school official. Additionally, courts will continue to
struggle with determining whether one incident, even if a severe
sexually violent act, can ever be sufficient under Davis, and whether
the severity requirement should be viewed through a reasonable student perspective, the eyes of the school official accepting the complaint, or an objective standard based on tangible injury to the harassed student. How extreme post-notice harassment must be to show
that an educational institution has acted with deliberate indifference
remains a disturbingly high threshold, and whether the Davis standard is dependent on educational level or age remains unclear.203
201. Id. at 644.
202. Id. at 645.
203. In Gabriele M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817,
821-23 (7th Cir. 2003), the court stated that “[t]here is a threshold question, altogether
reasonable and rational, of whether a five or six year old kindergartener can ever engage
in conduct constituting ‘sexual harassment’ or ‘gender discrimination under Title IX.
Common sense, at least, would reject any such extension of Title IX.” While the Seventh
Circuit determined it need not answer this question and assumed arguendo that the conduct alleged was sexual harassment, the concurrence took issue with the majority’s comment. While Davis did acknowledge simple acts of teasing and name calling, and actionable ages of the children involved and the likelihood they were unaware of the sexual nature of their behavior, with whether the harassment had a “concrete, negative effect” on
the victim’s education. The majority concluded that because the children “were” not engaging in knowingly sexual acts . . . (at a minimum) [this] detracts from the severity and offensiveness of their actions.” Id. The concurrence compellingly attacks the majority’s
proposition on three grounds. First, “[i]t is the school district, not [the harasser], that is
charged with liability . . . whatever the children’s comprehension may have been, the
adults charged with their care and education had the ability to appreciate the inappropriate and potentially harmful nature of the conduct.” Id. at 826-27 (Rovner, J., concurring).
This appreciation that a student is harassing another student is what triggers the school
district’s liability, not the harasser’s intent or full awareness of the inappropriateness of
the behavior. Second, while children may not fully appreciate the sexual nature of the conduct, “harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire, nor must it be overtly
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Until Congress defines the true nature of Title IX,204 Davis will
continue to spawn inconsistency and subjectivity in the federal circuit courts and will continue to serve as more of an obstacle than a
tool for student victims of sexual harassment in federally funded
educational institutions.

sexual in nature, in order to support a claim of sex discrimination.” Id. at 826 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). Lastly, while the majority
claimed the children lacked appreciation for the sexual conduct to be sufficiently severe,
the court in Gabrielle M. clearly found them to be unwelcome and inappropriate, as seen
through her manifestation of symptoms, including anxiety, bed-wetting, nightmares, and
loss of appetite. Id. at 827.
204. See generally Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984); Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§
1681-88 (2000)).

